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ABSTRACT 
The individual inventor motif has been part of American 
patent law since its inception. The question is whether the recent 
patent troll hunt has damaged the individual inventor's image and, 
in turn, caused Congress, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO), and the courts to become less concerned with 
patent law's impact on the small inventor. This Article explores 
whether there has been a change in attitude by looking at various 
sources from legislative, administrative, and judicial actors in the 
patent system, such as congressional statements and testimony in 
discussions of the recent proposed patent reform legislation, the 
USPTO 's two recently proposed sets of patent rules and responses 
to comments on those rules, and recent Supreme Court patent 
decisions. These sources indicate that the rhetoric of the motif has 
remained unchanged, but its substantive impact is essentially nil. 
The motif has done little to stave off the increasingly anti-
individual-inventor changes in substantive patent law. This 
investigation also provides a broader insight into the various 
governmental institutions' roles in patent law by illustrating how 
different institutions have responded-or not responded-to the 
use of the individual inventor motif in legal and policy arguments. 
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Information Technologies symposium hosted at George Washington University 
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INTRODUCTION 
The garage inventor is as American as apple pie. 1 We enjoy 
stories of independent inventors, working against all odds to 
provide society with amazing technological breakthroughs. The 
stories are so entertaining that popular movies are made about such 
individuals- such as Flash of Genius, telling the story of Robert 
Kerns, the inventor of the intermittent windshield wiper system.2 
Intel has even launched an ad campaign championing the 
individual inventor, portraying individuals such as Alay Bhatt, the 
inventor of the Universal Serial Bus (USB), as modem-day rock 
stars.3 
The individual inventor story generally goes as follows: A 
lone individual toils in her limited free time-evenings after work 
and perhaps the weekend-to come up with an amazing 
breakthrough that turns out to be incredibly beneficial to society.4 
This entrepreneur is unconstrained by both the bureaucracy of a 
large corporate structure and the traditional thinking in a given 
See Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 910 
(2002); Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property 
Law, 45 Rous. L. REV. 1201, 1202-03 (2008). 
An important point of clarification needs to made up front concerning this 
Article's use of the term "individual inventor." While this term clearly includes 
individuals, who by themselves invent, the term has also been used in the 
literature to include small businesses and entrepreneurs. See Meurer, supra note 
1, at 1201-04 (using the terms such as "small innovative firms," "small 
business," "small entities," "entrepreneurs," and "inventors" interchangeably 
when discussing how patent law handles this class of inventors); Janis, supra 
note 1, at 920 (discussing both "independent inventors" and "small business" 
when exploring the "heroic inventor motif'). Even the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office lumps these individuals together when defining "small 
entity." See 37 C.F.R. § 1.27 (2009) (including a "person, small business 
concern, or nonprofit organization" in the definition). 
This Article will follow the same custom and include all of these inventors 
when using the term "individual inventors." However, these classes of inventors 
have their differences, and these differences could come out in both the usage of 
distinct motifs (individual inventor versus small business inventor motif) and 
substantive impact. Such fidelity is not explored in this Article, mainly because, 
like those commentators and the USPTO before, these different inventors are 
usually lumped together, both in rhetoric and substantive analysis. I thank the 
editors at the Yale Journal of Law and Technology, particularly Molly Boyle, for 
raising this point. 
2 See FLASH OF GENIUS (Univ. Pictures et al. 2008). 
3 See Intel Corp., An "Intel Start" TV Ad-Sponsors of Tomorrow, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jqLPHrCQr21 (last visited Nov. 11, 2009). 
4 See Meurer, supra note 1, at 1202-03 ("Received wisdom holds that small 
business plays an especially important role in the American economy in terms of 
job creation, and that entrepreneurs are disproportionately responsible for 
revolutionary innovations."). 
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technological field. The drive and ingenuity of these small 
inventors is the life-blood of American innovation. It's hard-
working, creative individuals like Thomas Edison, Steve Jobs, and 
Bill Gates that bring about true innovations. 
This "individual inventor motif'-that small inventors play 
a crucial role in creating revolutionary inventions and, in tum, 
spurring the American economy-is, for the most part, widely 
accepted.5 The individual inventor motif is perhaps strongest in 
those technologies where independent invention is most likely-
such as the information technologies and business methods. These 
are technological areas where resources do not act as a high barrier 
to invention, and thus small inventors can easily participate.6 The 
patent system has traditionally taken the individual inventor motif 
to heart and seen patents as a vehicle to both fuel individual 
inventors and protect them from large corporations.7 
There is another, newer narrative that Americans are 
becoming more and more aware of-the story of the "patent 
troll."8 The narrative is as follows: patent trolls are patent holders 
who, while not commercializing the patented invention 
themselves, seek royalties from other companies who have.9 They 
hold up such companies, asserting their patent rights at the right 
time to maximize the royalties they can get. For patent trolls, 
patenting is about profit, not invention. 
If a defendant is sued by one of these patent trolls, the 
alleged infringers do not have the usual retaliatory mechanism-
the ability to assert their own patents in return-because the patent 
troll does not sell any products or offer any services which could 
infringe. The lack of production by the patent troll also means that 
society receives no benefit from the patent, just the tax of the 
patent troll. 10 Such "trolling" is common in the same fields that 
5 Id.; see also Janis, supra note 1, at 910-11. 
6 See John R. Allison, et al., Software Patents, Incumbents, and Entry, 85 TEX. 
L. REV. 1579, 1580-81 (2007). 
7 See, e.g., J. Douglas Hawkins, Importance and Access of International 
Patent Protection for the Independent Inventor, 3 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
145, 148 (1995) ("Independent inventors accounted for about half of all patent 
filings in the United States around fifty years ago."). 
8 See, e.g., Laurie J. Flynn, Chip Maker Wins Battle, but Faces Bigger War, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, at C8 ("Patent troll is a derogatory term used to 
describe companies or individuals who make their money suing companies for 
patent infringement."). 
9 John M. Golden, Commentary, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2112 (2007). 
10 See Mark A. Lemley & Doug Lichtman, Rethinking Patent Law's 
Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 48 (2007) ("Sadly, a large and 
growing number of 'patent trolls' today play this exact strategy, using patents on 
obvious inventions quite literally to tax legitimate business activity."); Daniel J. 
McFeely, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of Those Who Misuse 
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most individual inventors operate in-information technologies 
and business methods. These technological areas are more 
susceptible to hold-up because many of the products are multi-
component, allowing a patent covering even the smallest part to 
hold-up the whole technology.11 When the product is particularly 
valuable, even a patent on a small component can facilitate the 
extraction of a large rent. 
The intersection of these two popular narratives-that of 
the individual inventor and that of the patent troll-is the focus of 
this Article. Patent trolls are the targets of the current patent reform 
movement. 12 One of the difficulties that has plagued the push for 
change, however, is a definitional one-what exactly is a patent 
troll?13 
This is where the individual inventor-the person who is 
supposed to be promoted by the patent system-comes in. The 
individual inventor could easily fit within some definitions of a 
patent troll-both are individuals who are non-producing and 
monetize their patents by seeking royalty arrangements with larger 
companies. The biggest difference is that traditional thinking 
vilifies one and reveres the other. 
This Article examines this intersection to gain a better 
understanding of the place of the individual inventor motif in 
patent law. The individual inventor has been championed even 
before there was United States patent law. But how has the hunt 
for the patent troll impacted the individual inventor motif? This 
Article answers that question by looking at both the rhetorical use 
of the motif and the impact of substantive changes on individual 
inventors in all three branches of government-Congress, the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and the 
courts (particularly the Supreme Court).14 What this Article finds is 
that the individual inventor motif is incredibly resilient, at least 
rhetorically, remaining essentially unscathed by the introduction of 
the US. Patent System To Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
289, 290-91 (2008) (discussing how the patent troll "causes harm to society"). 
11 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Hold-up and Royalty Stacking, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2008-09 (2007). 
12 See Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A 
Transactional Model, 45 Hous. L. REV. 1165, 1199 (2008) ("To conclude, one 
thrust of current patent reform efforts focuses on remedies, with the most 
frequent object of discussion being the 'patent troll,' the nonexploiting owner of 
a patent whose business model is based on extracting licensing fees from 
unintentional infringers. "). 
13 Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1023-24 ("[It] is difficult to discern any principled 
distinction between the desire of the inventor to appropriate the value of his 
invention and the desire of operating firms to appropriate the value of their 
inventions."). 
14 See infra Section 11.B. 
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the patent troll into the discourse. 15 This inquiry also unveils 
additional, beneficial information about the motif. For example, 
the motifs positive rhetoric is completely divorced from the 
mostly negative substantive impacts of patent law changes on 
individual inventors. While the rhetoric lives on, almost every 
recent patent law change has been to the detriment of small 
inventors. 16 Variations in the motifs usage also tell a great deal 
about the various governmental institutions' roles in the patent 
system-with the USPTO catering the most to individual inventors 
and the courts being the most insulated from and apathetic toward 
such interests.17 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the 
individual inventor motif and looks at the use and treatment of the 
motif in the patent system prior to the advent of the patent troll. 
Part II then examines the impact of the introduction of the patent 
troll, both on the motifs rhetorical usage and the substantive 
impact of patent law changes on the individual inventor. Finally, 
Part III explores the implications of the Article's findings, both for 
the motif itself and for understanding the roles of various 
institutions in the patent system. Furthermore, pushes for patent 
reform at all three institutions have been constant over the past 
several years. Those who engage the patent system for reform can 
also learn about the motifs effectiveness from this Article's 
findings. 18 The additional insight into how the different institutions 
operate within the patent system can help such activists further, 
shedding light on which arguments play better in different venues. 
I. THE INDIVIDUAL INVENTOR AND THE UNITED STATES 
PATENT SYSTEM 
A. The Individual Inventor Motif Defined 
Americans see the individual inventor as crucial to the 
production of new inventions and innovations. This view of the 
individual inventor, what I call "the individual inventor motif," is 
infused throughout much of the history of the United States patent 
system.19 The motifs use supports the conclusion that one of the 
15 See irifra Section III.A. 
16 See irifra Section III.B. 
17 See irifra Section 111.C. 
18 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the 
New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 838 (2008) ("The 
process that has led to this reform effort has also turned up significant rifts in the 
coalition ofIP industries."). 
19 The motifs origins trace back well before the U.S. patent system. Janis, 
supra note 1, at 908-10 (discussing the British patent system's invocation of the 
individual inventor motif). 
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main goals of the patent system should be to assist, and in some 
ways protect, the individual inventor.20 
The patent laws do very little to prompt this view.21 The 
U.S. Constitution does identify "Inventors"-the individual 
creator, not corporations-as the target of the patent incentive.22 
And many of the founding fathers, the same individuals who 
played a significant role in shaping the U.S. patent system, were 
solo inventors themselves.23 Rather than resulting from any 
legislation, statute, or even the Constitution, invocations of the 
individual inventor motif in patent discourse are the product of the 
collective belief in the narrative itself: that small inventors are 
crucial to technological innovation and that the patent system 
should support their activities. 
B. Historic Usage of the Motif 
All three governmental branches have employed the 
individual inventor motif before and have often made it part of 
their analysis of the patent system. Mark Janis noted in his 
discussion of what he calls the "heroic inventor motif'24 that 
"[c]ommentaries and legislative studies on U.S. patent law reform 
in the mid-twentieth century periodically acknowledged the 
interests of independent inventors."25 The USPTO has also played 
to the motif, mainly through its separate fee structure and tailored 
resources for individual inventors.26 The courts, though not as 
20 Id. at 910-12. Meurer points out that it is far from clear that patents actually 
help individual inventors, particularly the slightly larger small company 
obtaining patents. Meurer, supra note 1, at 1230-35. 
21 Meurer, supra note 1, at 1203-04 ("Only a few IP law doctrines target small 
firms for specific benefits .... "). 
22 U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "). The patent statutes also award 
patents to named inventors, not corporations. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2006). 
23 See Dana Rohrabacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent System, 
8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263, 270 (1995) (noting many of nation's founding 
fathers were technologists). 
24 While Janis uses the term "heroic inventor motif' versus this Article's usage 
of "individual inventor motif," there is not much substantive difference between 
what the articles are discussing. Janis focuses more on what the individual 
inventor does-create a major invention-while I am focusing on a larger class 
of individuals-all individual inventors, regardless of the significance of their 
discovery. 
25 Janis, supra note 1, at 916. 
26 Janis also notes that "[a]nother example comes from mid-1960's symposium 
commentary from PTO officials in honor of the 175th anniversary of the U.S. 
Patent System. A symposium article published in the Journal of the Patent 
Office Society offered a poetic ode to the 'Godly Inventor,' commencing, 'A 
spark ignites your restless mind, a fearless soul, it starts to grind."' Id. at 912 
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much as the legislative and administrative actors, have also given 
credence to the individual inventor narrative.27 
Janis cataloged usage of the individual inventor motif in 
patent law in the late 1990s and early 2000s. All three branches 
paid homage to the individual inventor, albeit in varying degrees. 
1. Legislative 
In Congress, the main reform effort during the period Janis 
studied was the legislation that eventually passed as the American 
Inventor's Protection Act of 1999.28 Key provisions in the bill 
dealt with the publication of the patent application prior to 
issuance.29 The proposed legislation changed the longstanding 
practice that kept applications secret until the patent was allowed 
and issued. The legislation as originally proposed would publish all 
applications eighteen months after filing. 30 
Janis noted that this publication requirement met strong 
resistance from the individual inventors' lobby, which argued that 
early publication would essentially lead to theft of the small 
inventor's ideas by large corporations.31 As William P. Parker, 
President of the Vermont Inventors Association, put it, "[t]he idea-
thieves can make money from the idea before the patent even 
issues and when they are challenged, are in a better position 
financially to defend themselves than the legitimate owner."32 
Congress responded by amending the proposed legislation 
to allow patent applicants to opt out of the eighteen-month 
publication if the applicant was willing not to file for patents in 
foreign jurisdictions (which required such pre-publication).33 This 
amendment allowed individual inventors, who most likely would 
not be filing foreign given the high cost and low benefit of such 
filing to individuals, to avoid the danger of theft from early 
publication. Congress also changed the name of the legislation to 
the American Inventor's Protection Act, explicitly paying homage 
to the individual inventor.34 The legislation also included 
provisions to help protect small inventors from the invention 
(quoting Isaac Fleischmann, The Patent Office and the Independent Inventor, 47 
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 459, 465 (2965)). 
27 Id. ("The heroic inventor motif also manifests itself in judicial opinions."). 




32 Id. (quoting The Omnibus Patent Act of 1997: Hearings on S. 507 and HR. 
400 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 49 (1997)). 
33 35 U.S.C. §§ 122(b), 154(b) (2006). 
34 Janis, supra note 1, at 920. 
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promotion business.35 The final legislation did, however, contain 
provisions that individual inventors opposed. 36 But the changes 
made and the final naming of the act evidenced Congress's 
willingness to assist the individual inventor. 
2. Administrative 
The motif was also alive and well at the USPTO in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. The USPTO's website contained a special 
set of resources for small inventors. As Janis noted, the USPTO's 
"Independent Inventor Resources"37 section started with the 
following text: "To paraphrase our Declaration of Independence, 
America is the land of the free, home of the brave, and haven for 
the independent inventor. Nowhere else in the world does a 
government exist that supports its independent inventors to the 
extent that we do. The independent inventor is America's natural 
resource."38 As it has historically, the PTO also maintained a 
separate fee schedule for small inventors, allowing those who 
qualified for small entity status to pay essentially half the usual 
amount for most patent application filing fees. 39 
3. Judicial 
Some judges, while not as much as Congress and the 
USPTO, have also shown some concern for individual inventors 
during the time period studied by Janis. For example, Judge Linn 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
dissented from the court's en bane ruling on prosecution history 
estoppel, arguing, in part, that the majority's rigid rule "wrongfully 
set[] in place a regime that increases the cost and complexity of 
patent prosecution to the detriment of individual inventors"40 and 
"discount[ ed] the intrinsic worth in treating more fairly the 
individual inventor whose patent right is under administrative 
35 35 U.S.C. § 297; Janis, supra note 1, at 921. 
36 Janis, supra note 1, at 919-21; Phyllis Schlafly, Don't Fall for "Phony Patent 
Reform," INVENTORS VOICE, Aug. 1, 1999, http://www.inventionconvention.com 
/inventorsvoice/urgentalerts/080199schlafly.html ("This bill is called the 
American Inventors Protection Act, but should be called the Inventors 
Elimination Act. The independent inventors would be squeezed out and their 
inventions stolen from them, all for the benefit of the foreigners and the giant 
corporations."). 
37 Janis, supra note 1, at 911. 
38 Id. (quoting Independent Inventor Resources, http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/com/iip/welcome.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2001)). 
39 Muerer, supra note 1, at 1203-04. 
4
° Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 620 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (en bane) (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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scrutiny."41 Janis also identified other times Federal Circuit judges, 
during this time period, discussed a particular patent rule's impact 
on small inventors.42 Notably, however, the individual inventor 
motif never really played a deciding role in a majority decision 
during the time period Janis studied. While individual judges have 
discussed individual inventors, the courts, in majority opinions, 
have not. 
II. "PATENT TROLLS" AND THE INDIVIDUAL INVENTOR 
MOTIF 
Given the persistence of the motifs presence in patent law, 
Janis's conclusion in 2002 that "[o]ne cannot help but expect that 
patent law reform debates will continue to revert periodically to 
narratives about the heroic inventor" seemed, at the time, 
incontrovertible.43 However, recently a new "favorite villain" of 
the patent system has arrived-the '"patent troll' ... one of a class 
of patent owners who do not provide end products or services 
themselves, but who do demand royalties as a price for authorizing 
the work of others."44 This description arguably includes the 
individual inventor, perhaps jeopardizing the individual inventor's 
role in patent reform debate. The question, explored below, is 
whether the advent of the patent troll has affected the individual 
inventor motif in the patent system-both the rhetorical use of the 
motif and the substantive impact on individual inventors. 
A. Patent Trolls and the Current Patent Reform 
Movement 
A major concern of current patent reformists is patent hold-
up.45 A patentee has a patent on a given product, or more likely a 
single component of a given product, and uses that patent to hold 
up the product and its producer after the producer has made a 
significant investment getting the product to market.46 This hold-
up situation is particularly problematic when the patent holder is a 
non-producer.47 That is, the patentee does not manufacture the 
patented invention herself. This exacerbates the situation because 
society does not gain anything from the patentee herself because 
the product does not go to market, and the alleged infringer has 
41 Id. at 628. 
42 See Janis, supra note 1, at 913-14 (citing examples in the on-sale bar, public 
use bars, and remedies areas). 
43 Id. at 922. 
44 Golden, supra note 9, at 2112. 




12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 52 (2009) 2009-2010 
little recourse, because the common counterstrategy of threatening 
the patentholder with patent infringement is often useless.48 
1. The Patent Troll 
The patentees who are non-producing and engage in hold-
up behavior have been labeled "patent trolls."49 Patent troll activity 
is generally frowned upon because they act as only "tollkeepers" 
on the road of innovation. so Patent trolls tax innovation by 
extracting licensing revenue without giving back anything in 
return.51 Instead, "[b]y acquiring [patent] claims and threatening or 
pursuing litigation, the patent trolls seek and often receive 
economic settlements from genuine innovators and producers that 
greatly exceed the true economic value of the patents in 
question."52 The hold-up is "harmful rent-seeking," extracting 
more value then what the patent is worth. 53 
Modem patent reform efforts are directed towards solving 
the patent troll/hold-up problem. Two of the initial reports that 
sparked the modem patent reform movement-the Federal Trade 
Commission's 2003 report on innovation and competition and 
National Research Council's 2004 study of the patent system-
both identified hold-up as a significant problem of the U.S. patent 
system.54 Recent books on the problems with the patent system 
also identify hold-up and the patent troll as a critical component of 
the current patent problems. 55 
48 There is, however, some societal value even in a patent being used by a 
patent troll-value in the information disclosed in the patent itself, for example. 
See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWAL. REV. 539, 47-550 (2009). 
49 See, e.g., Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 
10 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 5 (2005); Robert P. Merges, Introductory Note to 
Brief of Amicus Curiae in eBay v. MercExchange, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997, 
997 (2006). 
50 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of 
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 907 (using the term "tollkeeper[]" to 
identify a patentee that does not assist the real world development of the 
invention but simply takes license revenue for that development). 
51 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 2-3, eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130). 
52 Id. at 6-7. 
53 Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive 
Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 509 (2003); see also 
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 11. 
54 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004); FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE 
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/1 O/innovationrpt.pdf. 
55 See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, p ATENT FAIL URE: How 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 160 (2008) 
(noting that "'troll-like' behavior is certainly a problem"); DAN L. BURK & 
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2. Definitional Problems 
The hunt is on, but it faces a significant hurdle recognized 
by many-who exactly is being hunted? Some view a patent troll 
as anyone having certain inherent characteristics-never practicing 
the patented invention and seeking only to license it. 56 Others go 
further with the definition, looking for more specific actions, such 
as asserting patents against practicing entities when a hold-up 
situation is highly possible in order to maximize royalties.57 
It has become difficult to pick a definition that is not over-
or under-inclusive. For example, as Mark Lemley points out, under 
an overly broad definition, most universities can be viewed as 
patent trolls. 58 Universities rarely, if ever, actually commercialize 
the patented technology they invent. 59 Instead, universities seek to 
transfer their inventions to others and, in the process, may assert 
patents in the hope of seeking royalties.60 Such actions could be 
defined as the work of a patent troll, but university-originated 
inventions, purposively spurred in part by the patent system, are 
seen by most as beneficial, not problematic.61 
Just like universities, individual inventors can also arguably 
fall under the umbrella of patent trolls.62 Garage inventors do not 
have the means to commercialize. Their main goal from the 
beginning, most likely, is to sell their patented technology to a 
larger company who has the capability to bring it to market. In the 
process, they may have to assert their patent to obtain such a 
royalty. These characteristics and actions are part of the individual 
inventor's narrative, but now they are also part of the patent troll's 
as well.63 According to one definition, a patent troll is "one of a 
MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How COURTS CAN SOL VE IT 28-30 
(2009). 
56 Brenda Sandburg, Trolling for Dollars, LAW.COM, July 30, 2001, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/PubArticle.jsp?id=900005370205 (describing the term 
as defined by its creator, Peter Detkin, then assistant general counsel for Intel 
Corporation). 
57 Mark Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 630 (2008) ("Instead of singling out bad actors, we 
should focus on the bad acts and the laws that make them possible. We will 
solve the troll problem not by hunting down and eliminating trolls, but by 
hunting down and eliminating the many legal rules that facilitate the capture by 
patent owners of a disproportionate share of an irreversible investment."). 
58 Id. at 629. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 629-30. 
62 See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in 
Judicial Activism in Interpreting the Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 165, 173 (2007) ("[S]o-called patent 
trolls are often independent inventors or small startups."). 
63 See supra Section II.A. 
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class of patent owners who do not provide end products or services 
themselves, but who do demand royalties as a price for authorizing 
the work of others."64 The same could be said of the individual 
inventor. 
As Ronald Mann puts it, "any effort to design a suitable 
definition of the term 'troll' is likely to lend credence to the view 
that the status as a troll is in the eye of the beholder."65 Some 
individual inventors will introduce real hold-up problems, and thus 
are legitimately patent trolls. However, a significant number will 
certainly not. 66 
B. The Patent Troll's Impact on the Individual Inventor 
Motif 
Given the focus on eradicating the patent troll and the 
individual inventor's similarities to a patent troll, the individual 
inventor motif may be in real trouble in modem patent discourse. 
Has the individual inventor universally become the villainous 
patent troll or has the motif remained unscathed (or is it sitting 
somewhere in between)? 
This Section attempts to measure the current status of the 
individual inventor motif in patent law in two ways. First, it 
examines the usage of individual inventor rhetoric by all three 
governmental branches to see if the motif is invoked as strongly as 
it was before the current emphasis on the patent troll.67 Second, it 
examines major patent law changes by the three branches to see if 
these changes-most seeking to remedy the harms of patent 
trolls-negatively impact individual inventors. By examining both 
the rhetorical use and the substantive impact of the motif since the 
rise of the patent troll, the current status of the individual inventor, 
at least in the eyes of major government actors, is hopefully 
clarified. 
64 Golden, supra note 9, at 2112. 
65 Mann, supra note 13, at 1023-24 ("It is difficult to discern any principled 
distinction between the desire of the inventor to appropriate the value of his 
invention and the desire of operating firms to appropriate the value of their 
inventions."). 
66 See Marc Morgan, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures: 
A Comment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 17 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 165, 177 (2008) ("[I]ndividual inventors should not be considered patent 
trolls. Though they do not produce their innovations, individual inventors are 
crucial to America's technological growth and account for 18% or more of the 
patent filers in the USPTO."). 
67 The study performed by this Article can be contrasted to Janis's work. Janis's 
work covers a perfect, contrasting time frame-right before the reform 
movement that focuses on patent trolls and the major patent system reports. See 
Janis, supra note 1, at 913-22. 
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1. Legislative View 
The major modem patent reform bill has been before 
Congress since 2005.68 While the specifics of the legislation 
proposed over the last four years varies, a majority of the 
amendments-from damages reform to post-grant opposition 
mechanisms-are meant to remedy the hold-up/patent troll 
problem. None of the proposed legislation has passed, with the 
2009 version having yet to be passed by either the House or 
Senate.69 The Patent Reform Act of 2007-H.R. 1908-came the 
closest to becoming law-passing in the House, but failing in the 
Senate.70 Thus, while there have been no significant legislative 
changes recently, the discourse surrounding the proposed patent 
reform bills-particularly H.R. 1908-as well as their substance, 
provide insight as to Congress's current view of the individual 
inventor in the age of the patent troll. 
1. Rhetoric 
In general, the discussions surrounding pending patent 
reform legislation include a very positive individual inventor 
narrative. No one in Congress during this period questioned the 
need to support individual inventors or look out for their special 
concems.7 Discussions of patent trolls and hold-ups were kept 
distinct and separate from mentions of the small inventor.72 
In fact, small inventors were affirmatively made a part of 
the legislative process. Almost every committee meeting on patent 
reform included a panelist who was herself, or represented, an 
individual or small inventor.73 The House Committee on Small 
68 Patent Reform Act of2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). 
69 See Patent Reform Act of2009, S. 515, 11 lth Cong. (2009). 
70 Patent Reform Act of2007, H.R. 1908, 1 lOth Cong. (2007). 
71 See 153 CONG. REC. H 10,270, 10,301 (2007) (statement of Rep. Jackson-
Lee) ("[W]e must always be mindful of the importance of ensuring that small 
companies have the same opportunities to innovate and have their inventions 
patented and that the laws will continue to protect their valuable intellectual 
property."). 
72 See Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H Comm. of the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 4 (2006) (statement of Congressman Bass) ("Dean Kamen really works 
and represents what is the heart of America's economics and industrial future. 
He is truly an inventor, and he owns and runs one of the Nation's few really 
successful modem development labs."). 
73 See, e.g., Patent Reform in the 11 lth Congress: Legislation and Recent 
Court Decision: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11 lth Cong. 
(2009), http:! /judiciary .senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm ?id=3701 (including 
testimony from Taraneh Maghame, vice president of a small company); Patent 
Trolls: Fact or Fiction?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, 
65 
12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 52 (2009) 2009-2010 
Business even had a full committee hearing on the impact of patent 
reform on small businesses.74 
The floor debate concerning the 2007 House version of the 
patent reform legislation-H.R. 1908-provides a very interesting 
perspective on the rhetorical use of the individual inventor motif 
by congress. The legislation before the House contained many 
provisions that were seen as hostile to small inventors. 75 H.R. 1908 
would switch the U.S. patent system from first-to-invent to first-to-
file and provided for automatic publication of all patent 
applications at eighteen months.76 H.R. 1908 also modified the 
damages provisions and established a post-grant review system.77 
These provisions were seen by some as providing large companies 
an unfair advantage in defending against allegations of patent 
infringement by individual inventors.78 
Almost everyone who spoke out against the legislation, in 
particular against the provisions identified above, invoked the 
individual inventor motif to explain the reason the legislation was 
harmful. For example, Representative Gohmert argued as follows: 
[The legislation must be sponsored by] huge 
defendants who wanted to drag small entrepreneurs 
into dilatory situations so that their invention or 
component could be usurped without proper 
compensation, even though it might mean the 
bankruptcy of the inventor and the destruction of 
the opportunity for the little guys with the inventive 
vision and spirit, which actually spurred some of the 
and Intellectual Property of the H Comm. of the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(including the testimony of Dean Kamen, individual inventor). 
74 The Importance of Patent Reform to Small Businesses: Before the H Comm. 
on Small Business, 1 lOth Cong. (2007). 
75 See, e.g., Adam J. Sedia, Legislative Update: Storming the Last Bastion: The 
Patent Reform Act of 2007 and Its Assault on the Superior First-to-Invent Rule, 
18 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 79, 79 (2007) ("The bill, currently 
on the Senate's legislative calendar and likely to come up for vote soon, faces 
heavy opposition from several interest groups, particularly small inventors and 
the biotechnology industry."). 
76 Patent Reform Act of2007, H.R. 1908, 1 lOth Cong. §§ 3, 9(a) (2007). 
77 Id. § 6. 
78 See, e.g., Darren Cahr & Ira Kalina, Of PACS and Trolls: How the Patent 
Wars May Be Coming to a Hospital Near You, 19 HEALTH LAW. 15, 16 n.9 
(2006) ("Although large corporations argue in favor of changes that reduce the 
risks of patent litigation, small inventors criticize proposals that disadvantage 
individuals trying to enforce their patent rights while these same corporations 
often have significant intellectual property licensing arms."). 
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greatest developments and wealth we know and 
have in this country. 79 
One House member, Representative Rohrabacher even went so far 
as to call the legislation the "Steal American Technologies Act."80 
Those supporting the legislation did not question the need 
to protect the individual inventor.81 Some said that the legislation 
as proposed would actually help small inventors.82 They also 
addressed these concerns by promising that changes to the 
legislation were made or were going to be made to address the 
individual inventors' concems.83 A few supporters went a step 
further, framing the discussion as one of balancing-a tradeoff 
between eradicating patent trolls and aiding the small inventor.84 
But such comments were incredibly sparse and came in a far 
second to pro-individual inventor commentary from those who 
supported the legislation. 
79 153 CONG. REC. H 10,270, 10,278 (2007) (statement of Rep. Gohmert, 
Member, Crime Subcomm. of the Judiciary Comm.) ("[I]t is big companies who 
do not want others to have the opportunities that they did."). 
80 Id. at 10,273-74 (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher) (noting that the legislation 
"would be a disaster for individual inventors"). 
81 See id. at 10,276 (statement of Rep. Lofgren) (recognizing the interests of 
"small inventors"); id. at 10,301 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) ("On the other 
hand, Mr. Chairman, we must always be mindful of the importance of ensuring 
that small companies have the same opportunities to innovate and have their 
inventions patented and that the laws will continue to protect their valuable 
intellectual property."). 
82 See id. at 10,282 (statement of Rep. Wexler) ("This bill will nurture and 
protect inventors, thereby promoting future Alexander Graham Bells and 
tomorrow's Microsofts."). 
83 See id. at 10,279 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) ("I am delighted that even 
though there are questions about, for example, the first-to-file over the first-to-
invent, this committee saw fit to add my amendment which means that there will 
be periodic review so Congress will be instructed on whether or not this works 
on behalf of all inventors big and small."). 
84 See id. at 10,276 (statement of Rep. Lofgren) ("I represent Silicon Valley, 
which has a diversity of high tech. Biotech, large companies, small companies, 
universities, small inventors, pharmaceutical companies, we have got them all, 
including small inventors working out of a garage. A balanced approach to 
innovation is essential to all of these entities."); id. at 10,277 (statement of Rep. 
Johnson) ("In order to continue to stimulate growth and reward inventors in 
these various sectors, we in Congress are charged with finding the right balances 
between protecting inventions and stimulating innovation."); id. at 10,280 
(statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) ("Thus, it is very important that we take care 
not to harm this incubator of tomorrow's technological breakthroughs. The bill 
before us strikes the proper balance."). 
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11. Substance 
In sharp contrast to the unanimity of the rhetoric, the 
pending legislation, particularly the H.R. 1908 version of patent 
reform legislation, would negatively affect individual inventors. 
Most of the legislation's provisions-particularly damage reforms 
and the post-grant review provisions-were all provisions that 
assisted companies to defend against allegations of infringement, 
particularly allegations by patent trolls. 85 While such provisions 
helped those who were defendants in patent suits, the provisions 
generally hurt those who would be asserting patents. This is 
especially true for plaintiffs with fewer resources and less 
sophistication, including small inventors. In addition, given the 
unlikelihood that they will manufacture or sell products or 
services, small inventors benefit more from patent strength than 
they do from laws which make patent defense easier. Aside from 
its pro-defendant provisions, the legislation also included the 
aforementioned shifts to first-to-file and automatic publication. 
Both moves were made to harmonize U.S. patent law with most 
foreign patent systems, but these provisions were also generally 
seen as harmful to individual inventors. 86 
The legislation was, however, eventually defeated. The 
current, 2009 version, which includes similar, albeit not as many, 
anti-individual inventor provisions has still not passed.87 And the 
provisions that were contained in H.R. 1908 as approved by the 
House, and more recent versions of the legislation, include 
compromises to soften the impact on small inventors. 88 Some of 
these are changes that were made during the House floor debate of 
H.R. 1908.89 Accordingly, the substantive impact of the patent troll 
on the individual inventor is currently nil, and the compromises 
and defeats may evidence the work of the individual inventor motif 
as continuing to protect small inventors in the patent system. 90 
85 See supra note 77. 
86 See supra note 75. But see Karen Simon, The Patent Reform Act's Proposed 
First-to-File Standard: Needed Reform or Constitutional Blunder?, 6 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 129, 138 n.77 (2006) (noting that the current 
first-to-invent regime in the United States is "costly" to small inventors because 
it prompts "large inventors to challenge the patents of small inventors more 
frequently" by filing interferences). 
87 See Patent Reform Act of2009, S. 515, 11 lth Cong. (2009). 
88 See 153 CONG. REC. H. at 10,297 (statement of Rep. Issa) (offering a floor 
amendment to the early publication portion of H.R. 1908); see also Patent 
Reform Act of2009 § 7 (removing the automatic publication requirement). 
89 See 153 CONG. REC.Hat 10,297. 
90 See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 468 
(2004) (discussing the success of the small inventors lobby). Another 
explanation, explored more infra Section 111.B, is that the changes were made to 
protect the pharmaceutical industry, not the small inventor. 
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2. Administrative View 
The USPTO's own literature, particularly on its website, 
provides insight into its current view of individual inventors. The 
US PTO' s response to comments on two recent rule packages also 
provides indication that the motif is alive and well at the USPTO. 
This Subsection examines both the rhetoric used by the USPTO 
regarding individual inventors as well as the substantive impact of 
its rulemaking. 
1. Rhetoric 
The USPTO has continued to describe the individual 
inventor in a positive light. The USPTO website has an entire 
section devoted solely to resources for independent inventors.91 
The USPTO has also espoused positive rhetoric concerning 
individual inventors in its response to comments on one of the two 
rule packages it issued in the last couple of years. In the first of the 
two rule packages, the USPTO issued rules concerning the 
continuation of patent application filings and claim limitations 
rules that were set to go into effect at November 1, 2007.92 The 
rules essentially limited the number of times a patent applicant 
could file for continuations of patent prosecution for a single 
application.93 The rules also limited the number of claims per 
application. 94 
A significant number of the comments received by the 
USPTO asserted that the rules would have a particularly harmful 
impact on small inventors, or as the USPTO identifies them, small 
entities.95 The USPTO confronted these comments head-on. They 
91 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Independent Inventors, http://www.uspto 
.gov/inventors/independent/index.jsp (last visited Dec. 16, 2009). 
92 See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent 
Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of 
Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). Due to litigation over the validity of the rules, the 
effective date, if they ever become effective, is still uncertain. See Tafas v. Doll, 
559 F.3d 1345, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding the claim limitation rules 
valid, and the continuation rules invalid because they conflicted with 35 U.S.C. 
§ 120 (2006), and remanding the case to the district court). 
93 See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, 72 Fed. Reg. at 
46,716-17 (revising 37 C.F.R. § 1.78, pertaining to continuations, and 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.114, pertaining to requests for continued examination). 
94 See id. (revising 37 C.F.R. § 1.75, limiting the total number of claims per 
application to no more than five independent claims and twenty-five total 
claims, and 37 C.F.R. § 1.265, describing the examination support document 
needed to be submitted to go beyond these limitations). 
95 See id. at 46,743-44, 46,745, 46,754, 46,758, 46,759-60, 46,763, 46,765-66, 
46,783, 46,788, 46,793, 46,798, 46,801, 46,811, 46,824, 46,828 (containing 
comments concerned with the proposed rules' impact on small entities). A small 
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did not dispute the underlying premise that small inventors' 
concerns were worth addressing. Instead, they answered whether 
the rules would have a negative impact on individual inventors and 
whether such concerns needed addressing.96 The USPTO also 
articulated the overall purpose of the rules as inventor-neutral.97 
The USPTO stated that the rules are meant to reduce examination 
backlog and improve the quality of examination across the board, 
not to address the patent hold-up problem, or, more specifically, 
the patent troll problem.98 
11. Substance 
The USPTO continues to adjust filing fees based on the 
filing entity's size.99 Small entities still have their fees essentially 
cut in half as compared to other applicants. 100 The rationale is that 
higher fees uniquely bar individual inventors' access to the patent 
system because of their lack of resources. 101 The adjustment of 
filing fees is meant to equalize access to the patent system between 
large and small inventors. In addition to these fee adjustments, the 
USPTO also made changes to the two recent rule packages to 
address substantive concerns of individual inventors. 
One of the main substantive concerns with the continuation 
rule package was that limiting the continuations available would 
harm small inventors. This is because such inventors are both more 
likely to file continuations and have fewer resources to effectively 
obtain adequate patent rights when continuations are limited. 102 
Individual inventors need patents earlier in the development 
process to secure investment. Thus, they need to separate earlier 
allowed claims and then continue prosecution on still-rejected 
claims. In addition, small inventors often cannot spend as much up 
front, and thus need continuations to spread out their application 
entity, as defined by the USPTO, includes a "person, small business concern, or 
nonprofit organization." 37 C.F.R. § 1.27 (2008). 
96 See id. at 46,743-44, 46,745, 46,754, 46,758, 46,759-60, 46,763, 46,765-66, 
46,783, 46,788, 46,793, 46,798, 46,801, 46,811, 46,824, 46,828. 
97 See, e.g., id. at 46,760 ("The changes being adopted in this final rule [37 
C.F .R. § 1. 78] do not disproportionately impact small entities."). 
98 See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Changes to Practice 
for Continued Examination Filings, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716. 
99 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(a)(l) (setting forth the filing fee for both a regular 
applicant and a small entity). 
loo Id. 
101 See Mike R. Turner, Note, The Future of the Corroboration Requirement in 
Patent Law: Why a Clear, Strict Standard Benefits All, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1319, 1344 ("[T]he government has been careful to avoid shutting the door to 
the patent office on small entities."). 
102 Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, 72 Fed. Reg. at 
46,759, 46,765-66. 
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costs. 103 The package also addressed the argument that small 
entities simply make up the majority of continuation filings. 104 
The USPTO responded to these comments, as well as those 
from other ty~es of inventors, by relaxing the limitation on 
continuations. 1 5 As compared to the initially proposed rules, 
instead of one continuation, an applicant could now file two as a 
matter of right. To obtain further time, an applicant could in 
addition file a request for continued examination. Furthermore, as 
the USPTO pointed out, small inventors can file even more 
continuations than these, they just have to meet the justification 
criteria. 106 
The USPTO also did a study to examine the substantive 
impact of the continuation limitations on small inventors. The 
USPTO found that 2.9% of applications filed by small inventors 
included enough continuations to require special justification under 
the new rules. 107 This was in comparison to a slightly lower rate, 
2. 7%, for all patent applications. 108 
There was also concern about the continuation rules' 
requirement that divisional applications be filed during the 
pendency of the initial application. 109 Small inventors would not be 
able to spread out their prosecution costs over the sequential filing 
of divisional applications, particularly as aspects of the invention 
became commercially viable. The USPTO responded by amending 
the rules to allow for sequential filing of divisionals.110 
Finally, there was also an argument that the limitation on 
the number of claims available under the continuation rules would 
harm small inventors. 111 Individual inventors may need more 
claims than the average inventor to provide adequate protection for 
their inventions, and cannot pay the financial and procedural price 
103 Id. (reporting comments asserting that "the rule changes could stifle the 
building of patent portfolios for small companies and cause a reduction of 
capital investment in these companies and in new technologies"). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 46,759 ("The Office has made modifications to these proposed changes 
such that this final rule will permit an applicant to file two continuation 
applications or continuation-in-part applications, plus a single request for 
continued examination in an application family, without any justification."). 
106 Id. at 46,745 (noting that if an applicant wishes to pursue more than two 
continuation applications, he must file a petition "showing that the amendment, 
argument, or evidence sought to be entered could not have been submitted 
during the prosecution of the prior-filed application."). 
107 Id. at 46,760. 
los Id. 
109 Id. at 46,745. 
uo Id. ("In response to those concerns and suggestions, [37 C.F.R.] § 1.78(d)(ii) 
as adopted in this final rule does not require that a divisional application be filed 
during the pendency of the initial application."). 
m Id. at 46,765-66. 
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of meeting the special requirement under the rules to get more 
claims. 112 
The USPTO responded by changing the proposed rules to 
allow for more claims to be filed than originally suggested. 113 The 
USPTO also studied the filings of small entities and found that 
24.4% of the cases would exceed the amended limitation on 
claims, as compared to a 23.7% for all applicants. 114 The 
difference in impact did not appear to be disparate between 
applicants as a general population and the individual inventors. 
Finally, small entities could file an examination support document 
("ESD") in order to obtain claims beyond those initially 
allowed. 115 And the USPTO specifically amended the rules to 
make this less burdensome on small entities, with § 1.256(f) 
removing the most onerous part of the ESD, the requirement to 
apply prior art to the proposed claims and articulate why the claims 
are allowable over that art, exclusively for small entities. 116 
There were also substantive concerns regarding the second, 
more recent rule package that contained procedural changes to 
filing appeals to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. 117 
There was discussion about whether the rules added an additional 
filing cost that would significantly impact small inventors. 118 This 
debate arose not so much in response to comments, but from the 
US PTO' s discussion in response to the requirements of the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act. 119 After making some assumptions 
about the number of individual inventor applicants that would 
exceed the space limitations, the USPTO concluded that the impact 
would be small and further change unnecessary. 120 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 46,788. 
114 Id. 
m Id. 
116 Id. at 46,798, 46,743-44 (noting that this inclusion was also in response to 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act); see also id. at 46,798 ("A number of comments 
argued that the search and analysis necessary to prepare an examination support 
document would add significant cost to the preparation of an application, that 
the cost would be significantly more than the $2,500 predicted by the Office, 
and that this would significantly disadvantage independent inventors and small 
businesses."). 
117 See Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
in Ex Parte Appeals, 73 Fed. Reg. 32,938 (June 10, 2008) (to be codified at 34 
C.F.R. pt. 41). 
118 Id. at 32,972. 
119 Id. at 32,969. Section 603 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act requires 
administrative agencies to analysis the costs of regulations to small businesses 
and consider alternatives to reduce the impact on such small businesses. 5 
U.S.C. § 603 (2006). 
120 Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals, 73 Fed. Reg. at 32,972 
("When [the assumption of the number of applicants going over the page limit] 
is compared to the 5,977 small entities that filed a notice of appeal with the 
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3. Judicial View 
While the Federal Circuit is usually the first judicial body 
that comes to mind when discussing patent law, 121 there has been a 
significant amount of patent law activity at the Supreme Court 
during the patent troll era. Seven opinions on significant patent law 
areas have issued over the past four years.122 And in almost every 
single one, amicus briefs were filed asserting that individual 
inventor's interests were at stake. Accordingly, the following 
analysis focuses on the Supreme Court and looks at both the 
rhetoric in, and substantive effect of, these decisions concemmg 
the individual inventor. 123 
1. Rhetoric 
In only one patent case out of the eight issued since 2003 
has the Court explicitly mentioned the individual inventor. In 
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C., the Supreme Court held that 
the general four-factor test for determining whether a permanent 
injunction should issue must be used in patent cases.124 Under the 
Office in FY 2007 (21,653 notices of appeal were filed by large entities in the 
same period), it demonstrates that the petition fee has the potential to affect only 
2.8% of the small entities filing an appeal. An effect on 2.8% of the small 
entities filing an appeal is not a disproportionate impact on small entities, nor is 
the actual number of 166 impacted small entities a substantial number."). 
121 See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator": A 
Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions of Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 657 (2009); Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme 
Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387. 
122 See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008); 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 
(2007); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 926 
(2006); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Ill. Tool 
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
123 Interestingly, there was little mention of the individual inventor by the 
Federal Circuit over the last five years. A search was done on the CTAF 
database on Westlaw-("small inventor" "small inventors" "small entity" 
"individual inventor" "individual inventors" "individual inventor" "individual 
inventors" "entrepreneur" "entrepreneurs" "small entities" "small business" 
"small businesses" "garage inventor" "garage inventors" "start-up" "self-made 
inventor") & da(last 5 years) & patent!-and only one case included a 
discussion related to the individual inventor motif, in Vada v. Cordis Corp., 536 
F.3d 1311, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008), where the Federal Circuit dismissed Yoda's 
argument that the denial of a permanent injunction to Voda conflicted with the 
provision permitting "self-made inventor[s]" to obtain injunctions in the 
Supreme Court's eBay holding. 
124 547 U.S. 388. 
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facts of the case, there was a question as to whether non-practicing 
entities could obtain permanent injunctions. 125 
In the Court's decision, the majority rejected the 
categorical rule that all patentees who are both willing to license 
and are not commercially practicing their patents should not be 
awarded injunctions. The Court identified "university researchers" 
and "self-made inventors" as those who "may be able to satisfy the 
traditional four-factor test."126 The Court essentially stated that the 
"self-made inventor[]"-the individual inventor-could still obtain 
an injunction after the eBay decision. 
One of the concurrences also focused on the type of patent 
holder seeking an injunction. That concurrence, authored by 
Justice Kennedy and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Breyer,127 indicated that district courts should take note of "the 
nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of 
the patent holder," and in eBay, the function of the patent holder 
was "quite unlike earlier cases," presumably because it involved a 
business method patent and, arguably, a patentee who was only 
trying to license the patent, not commercialize it. 128 The 
concurrence identified the existence of industries where firms use 
patents mainly to obtain licensing fees. Injunctions in these 
instances "can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge 
exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice 
the patent."129 In this context, the concurrence discussed the patent 
hold-up problem, noting that "[w]hen the patented invention is but 
a small component of the product the companies seek to produce 
and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue 
leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to 
compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve 
the public interest."130 Justice Kennedy's concurrence focused on 
patentees that exhibit patent troll-like characteristics, concluding 
that injunctions should not be available to such individuals. 
The majority took a neutral view of the individual 
inventor-telling district courts not to immediately conclude that a 
small inventor does not deserve an injunction. 131 The majority did 
not, however, go so far as to require that all individual inventors 
receive an injunction-like large firms, they have to satisfy the 
four factor test. However, the concurrence authored by Justice 
Kennedy muddled this message by focusing on the patent troll. 
125 Id. at 393. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 396. 
130 Id. at 396-97. 
131 Id. at 393 (majority opinion). 
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The concurrence encouraged district courts to watch out for patent 
hold-up situations, caused by patent holders just looking to 
monetize their patents. These cases, involving non-practicing 
entities using patents solely for monetary purposes, signify the rise 
of the patent troll problem, not seen in the "earlier cases."132 In the 
concurrence's view, the focus is on removing the unfair advantages 
injunctions give to some non-practicing entities who seek to 
license-a category of patentee that is commonly comprised of 
individual inventors. 
11. Substance 
When comparing the majority decision in eBay to 
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, the Court's rhetorical use of the 
individual inventor motif is inconclusive at best. The substantive 
story, however, is a bit clearer. Almost all of the Court's recent 
patent decisions have reached holdings that are detrimental to 
individual inventors. The main reason this is the case is that all of 
the decisions essentially weaken patent rights, and it's the patent 
right-not the shielding from accusations of patent infringement-
that benefits individual inventors the most.133 
For example, while the majority in eBay expressly 
indicated that "self-made inventors" should not be uniquely 
harmed by the Court's decision,134 this rhetoric has not stopped 
lower courts from denying injunctions to individual inventors. In 
fact, that language has been cited and then dismissed in a majority 
of cases denying injunctions to small inventors. 135 This is because 
the four-factor test for an injunction places small inventors at a 
disadvantage, particularly when read in light of Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence. As John Golden summarizes it: 
Despite the unanimous Court's warning against 
"certain expansive principles suggesting that 
injunctive relief could not issue in a broad swath of 
cases," district courts have responded in apparent 
lockstep to Justice Kennedy's concerns about trolls. 
Since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in eBay, 
district courts appear to have consistently denied 
permanent injunctions in cases where an infringer 
has contested the patent holder's request for such 
132 Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
133 But see BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 55, at 173-77 (concluding that 
patents are not as valuable to individual inventors as other methods of 
appropriating value from their innovation). 
134 547 U.S. at 393. 
135 See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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relief and the infringer and patent holder were not 
competitors. 136 
Golden continues in his analysis by noting that "[ s ]ystematically 
curtailing injunctive relief for such patent holders may inflict 
injury on patent trolls, but it may also victimize those classes of 
inventors whom patent law should be most careful to protect."137 
The class he is referencing includes individual inventors. 
Many other recent patent decisions by the Court seem to 
come out against positions advocated for by individual inventors. 
For example, in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 138 the Court held 
that 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), while making the combination of a 
patented invention outside the United States actionable 
infringement in some cases, does not cover the sending of software 
from the United States to a foreign manufacturer who uses the 
software to make a U.S. patented invention abroad. The argument 
by small companies and universities was that holding such activity 
not to be infringement created a loophole that corporations like 
Microsoft could take advantage of.139 Companies with foreign ties 
would be able to send their manufacturing abroad to avoid 
infringement, and could avoid liability for stealing a less powerful 
entity's invention that way. 140 
The Supreme Court's decision in Medimmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc. 141 disadvantages individual inventors because the 
decision makes it easier for potential infringers-those who 
individual inventors will enforce their patents against-to avoid 
contractual obligations and forum shop. In Medimmune, the 
Supreme Court concluded that a licensee can challenge the 
licensed patent's validity without terminating or breaching the 
underlying license. 142 The result of this holding also lowered the 
bar as to what creates an "actual controversy" for the purposes of 
sparking a valid declaratory judgment action, essentially allowing 
alleged infringers to control forum selection in patent suits by 
allowing them to file declaratory judgment actions even before 
136 Golden, supra note 9, at 2113 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 2113-14 
("Thus, the district courts' post-eBay practice may be in some tension with the 
Supreme Court's warning against the 'categorical denial of injunctive relief to 
broad classes of patent holders."). 
137 Id. at 2160. 
138 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
139 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Wis. Alumni Research Found. et al. at 5-6, 
Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (No. 05-1056). 
140 Id. 
141 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
142 Id. at 119-23. 
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breaching the license. 143 Such a result, as some amici argued to the 
Supreme Court, "erode[s] the sanctity of contracts and interfere[s] 
with vital policies favoring amicable resolution of commercial 
matters" that are so crucial for patentees who depend on royalty 
. h . 144 I 1 11 . streams to monetize t eir patents. t a so puts sma mventors, 
who would normally be looking for licenses as opposed to overtly 
seeking out litigation, at a disadvantage to large corporations who 
can take advantage of the forum advantages that filing early 
declaratory judgment actions present. 145 
Individual inventors are also disadvantaged bl the Court's 
decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. 14 because the 
case's change to the nonobviousness requirement makes 
patentability determinations unpredictable. The KSR decision 
rejected a "rigid" test for nonobviousness and replaced it with a 
"flexible" and "functional" approach. 147 Some argued that such a 
shift would render most significant individual inventors' 
inventions obvious. 148 "While large business may be only slightly 
impacted" by the hindsight the Court's test introduces, "small 
business concerns and struggling innovators [would be] certain to 
face an instant and devastating diminishment of corporate 
value."149 Others asserted that a flexible nonobviousness 
requirement would make it more difficult for individual inventors 
to secure financing for their research and development because 
"potential investors cannot evaluate the likelihood that the 
venture's pending patent applications will be approved or that its 
issued patents will be enforced."150 
143 SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1377-79 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
144 See Brief of Amici Curiae The Trustees of Columbia Univ. in the City of 
N.Y. et al. at 2, Medimmune, 549 U.S. 118 (No. 05-608). 
145 Even before Medimmune, courts were concerned about the advantages an 
alleged infringer might have if the requirements for filing declaratory judgment 
actions were relaxed in patent cases. See, e.g., Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Transonic 
Sys., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1012-13 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("Exercising 
jurisdiction over declaratory-relief actions under [expanded] circumstances 
would create a strong disincentive for patentees to communicate with potential 
infringers before filing suit, for fear of being sued first and thus forced to litigate 
in the defendant's forum of choice."). 
146 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
147 Id. 
148 Brief of Harold W. Milton, Jr. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 
2, KSR Int'!, 550 U.S. 398 (No. 04-1350) (stating that the inventions of 
inventors like the Wright brothers and Thomas Edison might be rendered 
obvious in hindsight). 
149 Brief of the United Inventors Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of the 
Respondents at 2, KSR Int'!, 550 U.S. 398 (No. 04-1350). 
150 Brief of Altitude Capital Partners et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 4, KSR Int'!, 550 U.S. 398 (No. 04-1350) ("Similarly, a firm like 
Altitude Capital Partners will be less inclined to back an independent inventor, 
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In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 151 the 
Court's holding is detrimental to individual inventors because it 
limits their ability to license their patents effectively. The Court in 
Quanta determined that a license with a computer components 
manufacturer exhausted patent rights against purchasers of such 
components who used them to make, without an expressed license, 
a patented system and perform a patented method. 152 Multiple 
amici argued that tiered licensing, which the decision in Quanta 
now makes more difficult, is a crucial vehicle by which small 
inventors recoup their costs of inventing. 153 Small inventors also 
rely on others to manufacture and distribute their product because 
they do not have the capabilities or resources in-house.154 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
The rhetoric regarding individual inventors remained 
extremely positive in both Congress and the USPTO. Both of these 
bodies also at least proposed substantive changes that took 
individual inventors' interests into account, even if they were not 
overtly pro-individual-inventor proposals. The USPTO changed its 
proposed rules to take the concerns of individual inventors into 
consideration, even creating a special exception for small entities 
in its claim limitation rules. Although Congress never passed any 
significant patent legislation during the period studied, it did 
seriously consider changes that would be harmful to small 
inventors. The proposed legislation, however, was modified, in 
some respects, to take at least some of the small inventor's' 
interests into account. The judiciary essentially did not take any 
notice of individual inventors' concerns-either on a rhetorical or 
a substantive level. The Supreme Court's recent decisions did, 
however, reduce the value of patents, particularly for individual 
inventors. The following table summarizes these results: 
or will do so only on much less favorable terms that diminish incentives to 
innovate, if Altitude cannot predict with reasonable confidence whether the 
inventor's patents will be upheld in court."). 
151 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). 
152 Id. 
153 See Brief for Wi-LAN Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 19-
22, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06-937); Brief of Amici Curiae Interdigital 
Communications, LLC & Tessera, Inc. in Support of Respondent at 12, Quanta, 
128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06-937); Brief of Amberwave Systems Corp. as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 10, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06-937). 
154 Brieffor Wi-LAN Inc., supra note 153, at 19. 
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TABLE 1. PATENT TROLL-ERA HANDLING OF INDIVIDUAL 
INVENTORS 
Rhetoric Substance 
Legislative Positive Mixed 
Administrative Positive Positive 
Judicial N on-existent155 Negative 
The following section looks at the implications of these results. 
A. Resilience of the Motif's Rhetoric 
When the rhetoric observed by Janis shortly before the 
modem patent reform efforts and the focus on the patent troll is 
compared to the rhetoric examined in Section II.B, one can see that 
not much has changed at all. Congress still engages heavily in the 
individual inventor rhetoric.156 The USPTO is still the strongest 
ally of the individual inventor. 157 And litigants continue to invoke 
the rhetoric in litigation, while the courts, maybe even less so now, 
do not seem to engage the motif at all. 158 
Other than perhaps the slight drop off by the courts, the 
individual inventor motif remains rhetorically intact-at least as 
much as it was before the advent of the patent troll. Those 
primarily engaged in the usage of rhetoric-mainly Congress and 
the USPTO-are able to keep the small inventor and the patent 
troll separate.159 The definitional concerns the patent troll hunt 
presents for the individual inventor motif are not justified. The 
garage inventor is still a narrative that policymakers find worth 
telling. 
B. Lack of Substance Behind the Motif 
It has been suggested before, most recently by Meurer, that 
while the motif is strong, there is very little doctrine, or laws for 
that matter, that are specifically designed to benefit the individual 
155 The Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. does mention "self-made 
inventors." 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006). Justice Kennedy's concurrence focuses on 
patent trolls, but not necessarily individual inventors. Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). However, the majority's discussion is still neutral and mentions 
individual inventors sparingly-it does not establish a pro-individual-inventor 
view of injunctions. And Justice Kennedy never discusses the size of the patent 
trolls he is focused on, so whether he is considering the individual inventor in 
his analysis is unclear. 
156 See supra Subsection II.B.1.a. 
157 See supra Subsection II.B.2.a. 
158 See supra Subsection II.B.3.a. 
159 See supra Subsections 11.B.1.a, II.B.2.a. 
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inventor. 160 Other than a few patent rules, there are no positive 
laws protecting individual inventors.161 The Congress attempts to 
stay, at best, neutral and simply avoid passing laws that 
disadvantage individual inventors. 162 Arguably, the Supreme Court 
tried to do the same in eBay, albeit perhaps unsuccessfully. 163 
Although the rhetoric is still employed, there is just no substance 
standing behind it. Other than the USPTO reducing some of the 
application filing burden on small inventors, there is little else that 
the patent system does to assist such individuals or address their 
concerns specifically. 
In fact, most of the patent law changes either proposed or 
actually made, mainly in the courts, have come out against 
individual inventors" interests. The provisions still being 
discussed in Congress focus on providing defendants with recourse 
to combat infringement actions, and are thus opposed by small 
inventor interest groups. 164 The same, anti-individual inventor 
effect can be found in recent Supreme Court decisions, with each 
recent patent decision making it more difficult to successfully 
enforce patent rights. 165 Thus, while the rhetoric remains strong, 
the emptiness of it is self-evident. The troll hunt may have not 
damaged the individual inventor's image, but it certainly has 
created substantive changes that cut against small inventors. 
The House debate over H.R. 1908 epitomizes the emptiness 
of the individual inventor motif. Opponents of the bill focus solely 
on the bill's impact on the small inventor. 166 And proponents, 
unwilling to verbally attack the individual inventor, played along 
rhetorically despite the fact that the law they were supporting made 
substantive changes that were potentially adverse. 167 What makes 
this exchange even more interesting is that the real substance of the 
debate was probably not big business versus the little inventor, but 
the information technology industry versus pharmaceutical 
companies.168 And the opposition to the bill-supported mostly by 
big pharma---did not harp on the legislation's impact on the 
160 See Meurer, supra note 1, at 1202-03. 
161 See supra note 103. 
162 See supra Subsection 11.B.1.b (describing Congress's recent patent 
lawmaking efforts). 
163 Golden, supra note 9, at 2113-14. 
164 See Patent Reform Act of2009, S. 515, 11 lth Cong. (2009). 
165 See supra Subsection 11.B.3.b (cataloging these decisions). 
166 See supra text accompanying notes 79-84. 
167 See supra text accompanying note 86. 
168 See Meurer, supra note 1, at 1214 ("Recent discussions of patent reform 
emphasize the disparate interests of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries on one side, and the information and communication technology 
industries on the other. Some of the discussion also notes tension between small 
inventors and big information and communications technology firms."). 
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pharmaceutical industry, but on the individual inventors. It is 
highly unlikely that the small inventor was the main concern of 
opponents, but at least externally that is how it appeared. 169 
Pharmaceutical companies have an interest in stronger patent laws, 
and since this interests aligned with those of individual inventors, 
which also commonly benefit from stronger patent laws, pharma 
found a friend. 170 The motif was an empty vessel that could dress 
up the concerns of another, perhaps less sympathetic interest 
group. 171 Presumably, if the interests of another powerful industry 
lined up with those of individual inventors, that industry would 
utilize the rhetoric of individual inventors for the same reason. 
Looking at the recent discourse involving individual 
inventors shows that it truly is only a rhetorical motif, and not 
much more, particularly outside the USPTO. Essentially, the motif 
invokes a very powerful narrative-a story that almost all 
Americans understand,172 but one that does not drive dramatic 
substantive change, particularly substantive change in favor of 
individual inventors.173 Instead, the motif is co-opted-particularly 
in Congress-by those parties whose interests are best furthered by 
policies that strengthen patent rights. 
C. Roles of the Different Institutions in Patent Law 
How different institutions have handled individual 
inventors' interests, particularly in the age of the patent troll, 
illustrates a great deal about the role of various institutions in 
patent law. 
The USPTO has been the most receptive to the rhetorical 
use of the individual inventor motif and actually substantively 
acted upon it, modifying proposed rules to give individual 
inventors specific exemptions. 17 Such a result makes sense from 
an institutional perspective for a number of reasons. First, the 
USPTO engages patentees almost exclusively on the patent 
169 Id. 
170 See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent 
System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1353 (2009) ("Other sectors, for example, 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, which depend heavily on patents 
to support their R&D projects and sustain their market positions, will prefer a 
strong patent system to foster market value for their innovations."). 
171 See Janis, supra note 1, at 911 ("One might expect patent reformers to be 
drawn to the strategy of reconceptualizing the reform debate by attempting to 
couple technical reform measures with the romantic imagery of the lone 
inventor struggling against a recalcitrant bureaucracy."). 
172 Id. ("[T]he heroic inventor motif, with its overtones of Jeffersonian self-
reliance and Yankee ingenuity, may simply mesh uniquely well with the 
American perception of its own identity."). 
173 See supra Section 11.B. 
174 See supra Subsection II.B.2. 
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acquisition side of the equation. The USPTO focuses on when 
individuals should, and should not, obtain patent rights. 175 This 
turns out to be the side of the patent system that individual 
inventors engage most. It is also the side the motif focuses on-the 
ability of individual inventors to create ground-breaking 
inventions. The motif should have the most impact on the front-
end of patent law, and thus the USPTO. Second, the USPTO's 
receptiveness to the motif also exemplifies the customer service 
nature of the agency .176 Finally, there are larger pro-small business 
attitudes at play when considering administrative agency. For 
example, the Regulatory Flexibility Act is focused solely on 
helping small businesses interact with regulatory agencies like the 
USPT0. 177 In both responses to comments on the recently 
proposed rules, many of the USPTO's responses to individual 
inventors' concerns were in response, in part, to the US PTO' s duty 
under the Act. 
This individual-inventor-friendly environment at the 
USPTO sits in sharp contrast to the judiciary's ambivalence to 
individual inventors' concerns. Every time individual inventors 
came up in the briefs, except arguably in eBay, the Supreme Court 
ignored them in the Court's ultimate decision. 178 This makes sense 
from an institutional perspective given the law that governed each 
of those cases made no special exceptions for small inventors. In 
fact, nothin~ within the Patent Act treats such inventors 
differently. 17 Given that overt direction, or lack thereof, by 
Congress, courts, as they arguably should, address only those 
concerns identified by legislators. The Supreme Court's handling 
of the motif evidences restraint, a lack of judicial activism, for 
want of a better term. 180 The judiciary's failure to consider the 
175 See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What 
the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 276-
77 (2007) ("Instead of asking whether a given patent is necessary to promote 
innovation, the patent statute directs the PTO to determine whether the patent 
application meets validity standards that have scientific and technical 
underpinnings."). 
176 See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 1559, 1567 (2006) (reviewing ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH 
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN p ATENT 
SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To Do 
ABOUT IT (2004)) ("[T]he PTO's profit orientation disposes it to grant its 
customer/clients' patents. Nor are these patents invalidated when they get to 
court."). 
177 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2006). 
178 See supra Subsection 11.B.3.b. 
179 See Meurer, supra note 1, at 1202-03. 
180 Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute 
Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 393-94 (2008) 
(setting forth a definition of judicial activism). 
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motif is the way it is supposed to work-with the courts immune to 
rhetoric and popular opinion, particularly popular opinion that is 
not expressed in any specific statutory provision. 181 This reason for 
the general absence of the motif seems especially likely given the 
court's language in eBay. The case discusses the application of 
equitable remedies, an area in which courts are least constrained by 
statute. And eBay is the only case in which the individual 
inventors' interests made their way into the opinion. 182 
The motif's lack of influence on the judiciary is also a 
product of the fact that, while the USPTO is on the front end, 
courts are, for all intensive purposes, on the back end of the patent 
system. They see the patented invention in the context of a lawsuit 
in which an allegedly infringing defendant has produced her own 
product or service. 183 This context is also the one where the impact 
of patent trolls is most noticed, because in those cases, the 
plaintiffs have produced nothing. 184 Sometimes it is also the 
context in which the individual inventor is not the only innovator, 
particularly since most cases involve a defendant that did not copy 
the invention, giving them some moral ground. 185 That is, the 
defendant is likely to have gone through the complete invention 
and development process themselves and simply come in second, 
behind the first to invent.186 The motif is, therefore, at its weakest 
at the enforcement stage and perhaps most susceptible to being 
ignored. 
Finally, Congress's handling of the individual inventor 
motif makes sense. Congress sits in the middle of these issues-
with individual inventors needing to be protected on the front end 
and patent trolls thwarted on the back end. Congress also is more 
likely to engage in rhetoric, particularly rhetoric its constituents 
understand and support. 187 And rhetoric that, in the end, turns out 
to be empty. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
These findings have tremendous import for the individual 
inventor motif and the patent system in general. The individual 
inventor motif has been around for a long time and has 
181 Id. 
182 35 U.S.C. § 283 (indicating that district courts "may grant injunctions"); 
eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 389 (2006). 
183 35 U.S.C. § 281 (giving a patentee a remedy of a "civil action for 
infringement of his patent"). 
184 See supra Subsection II.A. I. 
185 Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 
N.C. L. REV. 1421 (2009). 
186 Id. 
187 See Janis, supra note 1, at 911. 
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continuously been invoked in patent discourse. At least in its 
modem form, the motif has maintained its rhetorical strength in 
spite of the current negative focus on patent trolls. The prevalence 
of individual patent holders whose sole focus is to license their 
patents, not commercialize the underlying technology, so-called 
patent trolls, has not discouraged usage of the classic American 
story of the individual inventor. 
However, there are very few substantive changes that 
match the more extensive usage of strong, pro-individual-inventor 
rhetoric. Individual inventors fare better before the actor in the 
patent system that sees them the most-the USPTO. But even at 
the USPTO, there are not a large number of regulations being 
adopted that specifically benefit the individual inventor. Thus, 
those who engage the patent system for reform should take this 
Article's findings to heart, to better understand in which 
institutions the motif has more power and greater potential to 
prompt true change. This study also provides a broader picture as 
to how the various institutions are operating in the patent system to 
the benefit or detriment of small, independent inventors, additional 
information that reformists can use going forward. 
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